In Connecticut, a motion to strike is filed to contest the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint, counterclaim or crossclaim, or of any count therein, to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. [1] A motion to strike challenges whether the facts alleged, even if proven true, constitute a valid cause of action recognized by Connecticut law. In reviewing a motion to strike, the court looks only to the facts alleged in the pleading, construing them in the light most favorable to sustaining the legal sufficiency of the claim.[2] However, in ruling on motions to strike, courts often look beyond the four corners of the pleading itself, expanding their review to encompass any facts fairly provable under the pleading’s express and implied allegations.[3] This lenient standard, however, risks allowing bad faith complaints to survive into discovery — wasting the time and resources of both the judicial system and defendants, until discovery closes.
This practical consequence is illustrated by Patterson v. Mars Inc., No. NNH-CV26-6164746-S, currently pending in the New Haven Judicial District of the Connecticut Superior Court. Patterson sued Mars in December 2025, alleging that she consumed “milk chocolate M&M’s minis” and, shortly after consumption, went into life-threatening anaphylactic shock due to a peanut allergy. In her initial complaint, Patterson alleged what appears to be a failure-to-warn claim under the Connecticut Product Liability Act, asserting that “a person might have a peanut allergy and the product might cause danger to other individuals, including the plaintiff.”
Patterson’s counsel subsequently provided Mars with photographs showing that the product she had consumed was peanut butter M&M’s minis — which bear an express peanut allergen warning — not milk chocolate M&M’s minis as originally alleged. At Mars’ request, Patterson filed a revised complaint correctly identifying the product as peanut butter M&M’s minis and withdrawing her express failure-to-warn claim. Patterson continues to maintain, however, that Mars sold an unreasonably dangerous product and failed to adequately inspect and test it.
Mars subsequently moved to strike Patterson’s amended complaint, arguing that “Ms. Patterson alleges, in essence, that the peanut-branded candy she consumed must have been defective in some way because it triggered her peanut allergy.” Patterson opposed the motion, asserting that factual issues regarding the adequacy of Mars’ inspection, testing, warnings, and product-safety measures were factual issues not properly resolved on a motion to strike. On June 22, 2026, Judge Angelica Papastravos denied the motion, citing only the general motion to strike standard without further elaboration.
Patterson exemplifies the practical bind Connecticut’s lenient motion to strike standard creates for defendants. Despite uncontroverted photographic evidence establishing that Patterson consumed peanut butter M&M’s minis bearing an express peanut allergen warning, Mars’s motion to strike was nonetheless denied. As a result, Mars must now bear the full cost and burden of discovery to resolve a dispute that appears factually inadequate to support a legal claim.
Given these constraints, defendants facing similarly thin, but procedurally sufficient, claims should focus their strategy on discovery rather than on the motion to strike itself. Defendants should prioritize establishing a clear factual record through early written discovery. Through carefully crafted requests for admissions, interrogatories, and requests for production of documents, defendants can establish factual issues early in litigation. Defendants can capitalize on skillfully written discovery to narrow the focus of discovery depositions to address only true issues of fact. In a procedural landscape where the motion to strike offers little practical protection against factually weak claims, tactful discovery strategies allow defendants to efficiently build the evidentiary record necessary to pursue summary judgment.
[1] Conn. Practice Book § 10-39(a) (2026).
[2] Lawrence v. O & G Industries, Inc., 319 Conn. 641, 648-649 (2015).
[3] Kumah v. Brown, 307 Conn. 620, 626 (2013)
